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Abstract 
 
In this paper we consider that a representative of a not so affluent rural household has 
three options. He (she) may join in a microfinance system operating on the basis of 
individual liability credit contract, or on the basis of joint liability loan contract through 
forming self-help group or may not participate in any type of microfinance system. This 
paper establishes that wealthier among the not so affluent rural household prefers to join 
microfinance system operating on the basis of individual liability loan contract, 
comparatively less wealthy prefers to join microfinance system operating on the basis of 
joint liability  loan contract and ultra poor is less likely to join any type of microfinance 
system. This paper establishes that a household with high dependency ratio and higher 
intra-household decision making power of the head of the women of that household also 
influences the household to join microfinance system and in both the situations the 
probability of joining microfinance system operating on the basis of joint liability loan 
contract is slightly higher. It is also established that microfinance system fails to solve the 
ageing problem in rural areas because aged persons are less prone to join in any type of 
microfinance system.    
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CHOICE BETWEEN MICROFINANCE SYSTEMS OPERATING ON THE BASIS OF 
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY LOAN CONTRACT OR THROUGH JOINT LIABILITY 
LOAN CONTRACT 
 
Introduction: 
         Microfinance is emerging as a popular instrument towards the main objective of 
financial inclusion to the growing share of poor households who have not yet reached 
directly to the bank. This is a unique method to enhance the income generating activities 
and to create self-employment among the poor in variety of informal ways through 
generating savings habit among themselves and providing them small size of credit. 
Microcredit program is operated either under joint-liability or under individual-liability 
loan contract. But in most part of the world, microfinance system is operated through 
group-lending program which is actually based on joint liability loan contract. Here all 
the group members linked by joint liability have to help through repaying the debt of any 
one of the group she belongs who fails to repay. Hence non-borrower co-members of the 
group will have to constantly monitor the borrower group-member(s). In the group 
lending under joint liability, that can be done most efficiently and at very minimum 
effort. As the lenders now have to bear fewer amounts of monitoring, she can charge low 
interest against loan. Another interesting factor in group lending system is that 
considering moral-hazard problems when the contracts are enforceable and peer 
monitoring is present, the borrower is not willing to take huge amount of loan rather 
prefers to take small amount of credit to  invest in less risky project. But if the group 
members cannot observe each other’s effort or are reluctant to punish the shirkers, then 
group-lending microcredit system may encourage ‘free riding’. Now the group members 
are liable for a penalty when her co-members shirk and they cannot control that. Apart 
from that, there is confusion among the group members about getting credit at the time of 
their emergency. It is also observed that if multiple group members seek loan at a 
particular time, then it can not always be sanctioned due to lack of fund of the group. 
More over the loan size is limited by what the group can jointly guarantee. Heterogeneity 
in loan size can result in tension with in the group as clients and smaller loan holders are 
reluctant to serve as a guarantor for those with larger loans. In this situation clients dislike 
the tension caused by group liability. Excessive tension among the members is also 
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responsible for voluntary dropout. To avoid this situation, during the time of group 
formation mainly through self-selection mechanism, positive assortative matching is 
observed where good credit risks come together. Thus group formation has the property 
that it can drive risky types out of the group otherwise some of the costs of riskiness have 
to be borne by all the group members instead of bank alone. So members sometimes 
reject close friends for fear of social sanction during the time of group formation. Some 
may be reluctant to borrow if information about other members is not properly available 
to him (her). So clients with growing business and those well ahead of their co-members 
in the economic activity may find that the group contract bogs everyone down. In recent 
years some micro lenders such as the Association for Social Advancement in Bangladesh 
or the Bank of Rakyat Indonesia, have expanded rapidly using individual liability loan. 
Even the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has recently relaxed the group liability clause and 
encourage individual liability loan. In case of individual liability, each borrower is only 
responsible for her own loan. Here loan should be dearer, because the lender has to bear 
good amount on monitoring and that type of loan is comparatively more risky.  But we 
cannot ignore micro-credit under individual liability, which looks no less successful 
particularly after observing the performance of Bank of Rakyat in Indonesia. Recently 
researchers have been interested in comparing group lending program to individual 
lending scheme. It is actually a neglected aspect of the research in microfinance to 
identify the factors which can motivate a rural household to join microfinance system 
operating on individual liability loan contract not under joint-liability loan contract 
through forming Self-Help Group.   
Overview of literature: 
Repayment is the only outcome of interest to the lender because of its ability to retain 
good borrowers. With this attract new ones is also equally important to access the overall 
profitability. Madajewicz (2008) established in her theoretical model that group liability 
loan is only desirable for the poor borrowers. In her model, below a certain level of 
wealth, group liability dominates individual liability. But above a certain wealth, 
individual liability will be preferred by rural households. More over she find that business 
funded with individual loans grow more than those funded with group loans. Lehner’s 
(2008) result is quite different where he theoretically established that microfinance 
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institutions offer group loans when size of credit is quite large. With a rather small loan 
size, all microfinance institutions offer individual loans. This paper is actually based from 
the point of view of a microfinance institution which offers individual loan as well as 
group loan. Empirical research on group versus individual liability borrowing has not 
provided policymakers and institutions the clear evidence needed to determine the 
relative merits of the two methodologies. The empirical literature instead has focused on 
related questions: which group characteristics lead to higher repayment (Ahiu, Townsend 
2007). Borrowers who take individual liability loans look no different than same under 
joint liability when judged by repayment rates. The well behaved borrower both joint 
liabilities as well as individual liability has repayment rates as high as 95%. The 
repayment rate in each and every financial year of Bangladesh Grameen Bank and Bank 
of Rakyat establishes the fact. Gine and Karlan (2006) conducted a field experiment in 
Phillipines. They found that by offering individual loans a microfinance institution can 
attract relatively more clients. Yet both types of lending schemes do not differ in 
repayment rates. The basic question of the relative merits of group versus individual 
liability loan contract remains unanswered because almost all microcredit lenders offer 
only one type of contract either through joint liability or through individual liability and 
in a particular locality only one type of microcredit system is generally observable and 
most of the times that is through joint liability. But borrowers would be better off if he 
has a choice of microcredit contract between individual liability and joint liability. If that 
is available, then we have to identify the situation at which the borrower will choose 
microfinance system operating either through individual liability or through joint liability 
loan contract. In our investigation we will consider two separate types of microfinance 
institutions one is Vivekananda Sevekendra –O- Sishu Uddyan (VSSU), a microfinance 
institution operating on the basis of individual liability loan contract and government 
supported microfinance system under SGSY scheme which is operating through joint 
liability loan contract through forming Self Help Group mainly among the village 
married women. Before investigating the factors which can influence a rural household to 
join in any of the above type of microfinance system, initially we should require a brief 
idea about the operating procedure of both types of microfinance system.  
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 Vivekananda Sevakendra–O-Sishu Uddyan (VSSU) is a microfinance institution 
operates the microfinance programme on the basis of individual lending in nine blocks of 
South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal. The blocks are Kulpi, Mandir Bazar, Pathar 
Pratima, Kakdeep, Sagar, Diamond Harbour, Mathurapur -1 and 2 and Raichak. VSSU is 
operating without any financial support from the government. Total number of members 
under VSSU in 2006-07 had crossed 45000. It is involved in the provision of small scale 
savings and loan to rural individuals and business enterprises. VSSU collects savings of 
its clients from their doorsteps through his employees called ‘motivators’. The savings 
can be daily savings, weekly savings or monthly savings. In daily savings scheme, each 
client can save at least Rs.10 daily. The rate of interest against savings deposit is 4% per 
annum. After accumulation of certain amount of savings regularly that individual can get 
credit from the micro-finance institution at least six months after becoming member of 
VSSU. The repayment period is generally one to three years depending on the size of 
loan. The loan has to be repaid in installment where monthly interest rate varies between 
2% to 2.5% provided the size of borrowing is more than the amount of his savings 
deposits in the financial institution. But if the size of borrowing is less than the amount of 
his savings deposit, then the interest rate charged by the financial institution is 1.5% per 
month. As reported, most of the borrowers from VSSU borrow more than their savings 
deposit. If a client takes Rs.10,000 as loan from VSSU, then he has to pay around Rs.600 
per month if we wants to repay that loan with in two years and Rs.800 if he wants to 
repay that with in 18 months. Besides that the borrower has to save at least Rs.10 daily 
i.e. Rs.300 monthly. So a borrower has to deposit Rs.900 altogether to VSSU in a month 
if he borrows Rs.10000 and wants to repay that with in two years. The respondent can 
borrow more than his savings deposit provided he has good amount of assets with high 
collateral value and he can place a guarantor during the time of sanctioning loan. So the 
borrower is monitored not only by the motivators of VSSU but also by the guarantor. At 
the time of sanctioning individual loan by VSSU no specific preference is given to the 
female members of the households.  
In those same blocks we also observe the existence of government supported 
microfinance programme under Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarojgari Yojana (SGSY) 
scheme operated by the Central government with the help of local panchayet and District 
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Rural Development Agency (DRDA). This programme is motivated by the concept of 
group lending adopted by Bangladesh Grameen Bank. Here each group consists of not 
more than 15 members. The members are homogeneous in nature and they belong to 
same socio-economic background. It is operating like ROSCA (Besley, Coat, Loury, 
1993). Self Help Group is formed by the intended participants. They initially have to 
contribute a minimum amount in their respective groups regularly and on monthly (and 
sometimes on weekly) basis. The total collected amount is deposited in to nearby 
commercial bank. Each group has a group leader and a treasurer who are selected 
democratically by the group members. After accumulation of certain amount of group 
corpus, a member can take credit from the group she belongs. At the time of demanding 
loan she has to explain clearly in which purpose loan is required for her. If her 
explanation satisfies other group members, then only loan is granted where written 
consent of all the group members is necessary. This is required because all the group 
members are jointly responsible for repayment of that loan. The credit has to be repaid 
with in stipulated time period. Most of the times, the rate of interest is 2% per month. 
After six months of group formation, the commercial bank, DRDA officials and a 
representative of the panchayat will examine the performance of the group. If it is 
satisfactory, then that group will be qualified as Grade-1. After that, the group can get 
refundable financial help from DRDA and cash credit from commercial bank. The group 
has to repay the cash credit with interest but the contribution of DRDA is an interest free 
loan. Sum total of the two above mentioned fund is called revolving fund, which totally 
depends on accumulated group corpus prior to gradation test. So micro-credit under 
SGSY scheme is based on ‘Progressive lending’ which enables the lender to ‘test’ 
borrowers with small loans at the initial stage in order to screen out the worst prospects 
before expanding the loan scale. The revolving fund makes the financial condition of the 
group healthy and the group can then disburse larger amount of credit to it members so 
that more members can now invest the credit in different income generating activities. It 
is expected that higher investment means higher return and that can help the borrower to 
improve the livelihood of his (her) family.  
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 Research Question and Sample Design:  
Basic objective of a microfinance institution is often regarded as poverty alleviation, but 
financial inclusion subsumes this objective as long as reaching the poor or maximizing 
depth of outreach is given equal attention in product design, delivery systems and 
monitoring. Microfinance services include micro savings, microcredit and insurance. 
Actually before getting credit from any type of microfinance institution each would be 
borrower has to save in installment in that microfinance institution according to the terms 
and conditions decided by that institution. So before joining any microfinance system the 
borrower who is planning to borrow from that institution is clear enough about its savings 
capacity. Now he (she) will select his (her) preference among those two above mentioned 
types of microfinance system if both are easily available in the locality where he (she) 
belongs. In this paper we want to investigate ‘whether the wealthy among the not so 
affluent rural people prefers to join in the microfinance system operating on the basis of 
individual liability loan contract, the comparatively less wealthy rural people prefers to 
choose microfinance system operating under joint liability loan contract through forming 
Self-Help Group and poor rural households have little chance to join in any above two 
types of microfinance system’. It is obvious that affluent rural households have greater 
accessibility to banks and post offices and they have valued assets which can easily be 
considered as collateral at the time of drawing credit from the formal financial 
institutions like bank and most of the times their required size of credit is quite large. So 
only the ‘not so affluent’ rural households want to join any microfinance institution 
where the required size of credit is not so large. It is assumed that the upper limit of the 
market value of asset of the rural households is not more than Rs.300000i during the time 
of joining any microfinance system.  
We initially have chosen three-gram panchayets Gabberia, Ghateswar, Krishnapur of 
Mandirbazar Block of South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal where we observe 
simultaneous existence of both types of microfinance systems. The sample villages are 
Gabberia, Tajpur, Raghunathpur, Raipur and Bhagirathpur of Gabberia gram panchayet, 
Ghateswar, Polerhat, Bijoygaunj, and Baidyapara of Ghateswar Gram panchayet and 
Krishnapur and Madhabpur of Krishnapur Gram panchayet.  The block, gram panchayets 
and villages under the sample gram panchayets were chosen randomly. In our sample 
 9
villages the rural household has a choice and he (she) can participate in microfinance 
system operating either on the basis of individual liability loan contract or under joint 
liability loan contract. He (she) may not participate or fails to participate in any above-
mentioned type of microfinance programme also. If we look at the economic conditions 
of the sample villages we observe mono cropping is a common feature in all three gram-
panchayets of Mandir Bazar block because agricultural land is not so fertile and irrigation 
facilities are also not very developed. The agricultural wage rate is Rs.70 per day. All the 
wages are paid in cash. Due to pre-dominance of marginal farming in those sample 
blocks the agricultural laborers fail to get even 60 full man-days of employment annually. 
So to supplement their income they have to work either non-farm sector or urban 
informal sector mainly in and around Kolkata. The female members of the households 
fail to get sufficient number of days of employment in the farm sector. A large number of 
them are working as domestic workers in and around Kolkata. There is little job 
opportunity in non-farm sector. A large number of agricultural workers are working as 
rickshaw van-puller in the agricultural slack season and earns around Rs.40 per day.  
Initially we have to draw samples of the rural households of those sample villages from 
its voter list randomly. After that each representative of the sample household is asked 
whether he (she) a member of VSSU or Self-Help Group (SHG) under SGSY scheme or 
not. If the household belongs to any microfinance system then he (she) is asked whether 
he (she) joined in any of the above microfinance institution around August to October 
2007 (which is here represented as tth time period) because to identify the factors which 
can influence the individuals at the time of taking decision about joining any 
microfinance system a specific time period is required and in our investigation August to 
October in 2007 is considered that particular time periodsii. If the household has joined in 
any microfinance system during that specific time period then he (she) was asked his 
details socio-economic conditions during the time of joining the programme. So total 
sample is divided in to three following groups.    
1. The sample respondents joined in VSSU in the tth period.  
2. The sample respondents who have formed SHG under SGSY scheme of the 
government in the tth period. 
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3. A non-participants household in any type of microfinance programme belongs to 
almost same socio-economic background and have not joined in any type of microfinance 
system in the tth  period but have the eligibility criterion for joining any type of 
microfinance system.  
The first two categories of samples belong to the treatment group while the last category 
of samples belongs to the reference group. During the time of considering the treatment 
group, we have to consider sample households belong to both types of group separately. 
Total sample size of the treatment group is 244. Out of which 121 belongs to first 
treatment group, 123 belongs to second treatment group (drawn randomly from 22 Self-
Help Groups under SGSY scheme where 18 are totally women groups and 4 are male 
groups). Total sample size of non-participant households (control group) is 90. During 
the time of drawing samples of the treatment group we ignore the households who are 
involved in both types of microfinance programme though total number of such 
households in those three gram panchayets is very few. If that happens, then there is a 
possibility that the borrowers will become over indebted and they may have the intension 
through paying one lender’s instalment by taking a loan from another.  
Choice of a Rural Household between VSSU and SHG under SGSY: 
To test the above mentioned hypothesis, we initially have to estimate the value of wealth 
of the sample respondents both belong to treatment group and control group. Here to 
estimate the value of wealth of the respondent households in monetary terms we have to 
consider the market value of land that respondent household ownsiii, the market value of 
the existing business the respondent households runs in the tth period, and (or) the market 
value of two-wheeler, pump set, poultry, bullock and (or) cycle respectively in the tth 
period. Here we do not consider the market value of the homestead that the respondent 
rural household owns. 
Initially we consider the following linear equation and want to estimate that through 
Multinomial Logit Regression method. 
 
Here the dependent variable Yj can be expressed in the following way: 
 =1 If the respondent joined VSSU in the tth period,   if the respondent joined in 
SGSY scheme through forming SHG in the tth period and  if the respondent did not 
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join in any type of microfinance system in the tth  period. Here the first two groups belong 
to treatment group and the last one belongs to reference group or control group. 
VASSETjt is the value of asset of the jth household in the tth period and uj is the 
disturbance term. Here . The regression result can be 
expressed in Table-1  
Table-1 
Explanatory 
Variable 
=1 Odd Ratio  Odd Ratio 
Constant -.045*  .124*  
VASSET1 .000141* 1.0254 .0000107 1.000 
Pseudo R2 : Cox and Snell = .28, Nagel Kerke = .301 Mc Fadden = .191 
From Table-1 it is clear that ‘odd ratio’ in both the situations  . So the above 
regression result shows higher the value of asset higher will be the probability of the rural 
households to join microfinance programme operating both through individual liability as 
well as under joint liability loan contract. But with the increase of the value of asset the 
probability of joining VSSU will be comparatively higher than joining under SGSY 
scheme because the odd ratio of the first one is 1.0254 and that of second is 1.000. Table-
2 shows how the value of probability of joining two different types of microfinance 
system changes with the increase of the value of assets of the sample households. 
Table-2: Probability of Joining VSSU or SHG for different values of Asset. 
Value of Asset (Rs.) Probability(j=1) 
VSSU 
Probability (j=2) 
SGSY 
Probability (j=3) 
Non Participant 
0 .30 .37 .33 
60,000 .42 .39 .19 
90,000 .46 .40 .14 
120000 .52 .38 .10 
 
From the above table it is clear that at lower value of Asset there is little difference in 
terms of probability when j=1, j=2 or j=3. But with the increase of the value of asset the 
probability of joining of a sample rural household in microfinance system operating on 
the basis of individual liability loan contract is much higher than that operating through 
joint-liability loan contract. Effective individual lending models across the world have 
few characteristics such as guarantees of loan repayment by a co-signer or through 
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collateral, close personal relationship with individual clients and frequent close contracts 
with individual clients. Everything is done by VSSU for its clients mainly through the 
‘door step’ service with the help of motivators. Again from the client’s point of view high 
value of asset indicates higher value of collateral. As income is highly correlated with the 
value of asset and savings depend upon income it is obvious that savings capacity of a 
rural household with higher value of asset is also much higher. Besides that due to 
availability of door step service that can be done much easier way. Hence comparatively 
wealthy among the not so affluent rural households prefer to join VSSU, a microfinance 
system operating on the basis of individual liability loan contract.        
But as the value of Pseudo R2  in the above Multinomial logit model is low, we are now 
trying to find out other factors apart from VASSETjt which can play a significant role at 
the time of taking decision on joining any type of microfinance programme mainly under 
individual liability loan contract. So we consider the following extended Multinomial 
Logit regression model. 
 
                                                                                                    …………………….(2) 
 Here apart from value of asset, Age, Educational Level of the sample respondent (Edu) 
in terms of total number of years spent on education, Dependency ratioiv of the sample 
household in the tth period (DRatiojt ), Skill or existing entrepreneurial activity of the 
sample house hold (Skillj ) and the value of Women’s Empowerment Index of the main 
woman of the sample household (WEMPjt) in the tth period  are considered as explanatory 
variables. 
Skill here is treated as dummy variable and = 1 if the respondent has few entrepreneurial 
activity or technical skill which he (she) can properly expand and utilize through 
investment after taking credit from the microfinance institution. It will be considered as 
‘0’ if the respondent does not have such skill or entrepreneurial ability in the tth period. 
We have also calculated Women’s Empowerment Index at the tth period (the method of 
calculating the Index is shown in Appendix-1). During the time of calculating the 
Empowerment Index, we consider the woman who intends to join in any type of 
microfinance programme or the wife of the respondent who intends to join in any type of 
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microfinance programme or head of the women of the sample households belong to 
control group. The Multinomial Logit Regression result is shown in Table-3   
Table-3 Factors which influence a household to choose either VSSU or SHG or nothing. 
Regressor Yi = 1 (VSSU) Odd Ratio Yi = 2 (SGSY) Odd Ratio 
Constant .574**  4.154**  
Age -.0918* .91 -.184* .873 
Edu .056 1.50 .0971 1.001 
VASSET1 .000012* 1.0256 .0000102** 1.00 
DRatioi .489** 1.631 .428** 2.213 
Skilli 2.931** 16.958 3.056** 51.808 
WEMPi .117* 1.124 .195* 1.348 
N 121   123 
Pseudo R2 = Cox and Snell = .474, Nagel Kerke = .534 , Mc Fadden = .295 
*=> significant at 1% level and **=>significant at 5% level.  
The above result can be interpreted in the following way: 
1. Aged persons are less likely to join in any type of microfinance programme. Actually 
with the increase of age an individual becomes less motivated to initiate a new or expand 
his (her) existing income generating activity after taking credit from any financial 
institution particularly from the microfinance institution where the rate of interest against 
credit is high and that has to be repaid with in a very short period. So microfinance 
programme can not be considered as a good instrument to remove the ageing problem 
among the rural households. 
2. Education level of the respondent does not play any significant role at time of taking 
decision about joining any microfinance programme. 
3. Higher dependency ratio influences the rural households to join in any type of 
microfinance programme operating either through individual liability loan contract or 
through joint liability loan contract. But the probability of joining in SGSY is more than 
VSSU (as shown through odd ratios). A household with high dependency ratio has to 
spend major part of its income for consumption purposes (mainly for food consumption) 
and very few amounts are left for savings purposes. It is already mentioned that the 
minimum required size of compulsory savings of a rural household who wants to join 
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microfinance system operating under joint liability loan contract under SGSY scheme is 
far less than that who wants to join VSSU. So the probability that a household with high 
dependency ratio prefers to form Self-Help Group under SGSY scheme is slightly higher 
than joining VSSU.       
4. A household with some technical skill and (or) entrepreneurial ability as well as existing 
activity is always more prone to join in any type of microfinance system but at 
unchanged VASSETt and other explanatory variables, the probability of forming Self-
Help Group in SGSY scheme is more than joining in VSSU. Actually a purely landless 
agricultural labour household or a household who is earning its livelihood through non-
farm activities but do not have any entrepreneurial ability and technical skill have less 
incentive to join in microfinance program because it has little opportunity to expand or 
start a new business through utilizing the microcredit for investment. Few such 
individuals have joined in microfinance system in order to take credit in future for 
emergency purposes or during the time of distress as they almost have no accessibility to 
get credit from organized credit sector. It is observed from my survey data that 73.14% of 
the total new entrants under SGSY scheme, 62% of the new entrants of VSSU and only 
12% of the total sample respondents in reference category have some technical skill and 
(or) entrepreneurial ability in the tth period. A sizable number of rural households without 
any technical skill or entrepreneurial activity have joined VSSU in the tth period mainly 
to save part of their income regularly through door step service. They do not have any 
future specific plan to take credit from VSSU. But major percentage of new entrants have 
joined SGSY scheme to improve their economic condition after taking credit from their 
respective group in future and to invest that in income generating activities using their 
little technical know-how or  for expanding their own small business. Their requirement 
of credit is also not so high and their accessibility in the organized credit sector is low but 
they have clear vision about their future plan. So the possibility of a rural household with 
skill or entrepreneurial ability to join Self-Help Group under SGSY scheme is slightly 
higher though they have a clear idea about the drawbacks of group lending system. 
5.  Woman’s empowerment always 
plays a significant role at the time of taking decision about joining the microfinance 
program. The above Multinomial Logit regression shows higher the value of Woman’s 
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Empowerment Index or higher intra household decision making power of the head of the 
women of the household, higher will be the probability of the respondent rural household 
to join microfinance program where the probability is slightly higher for joining SGSY 
scheme than joining VSSU. This is because local married rural women are giving 
preference during the time of forming self-help group under SGSY scheme.  
Conclusions: This paper empirically supports Madajewicz (2008). Here also wealthier 
among the less affluent rural households prefer to join microfinance system operating on 
the basis of individual liability loan contract (here VSSU) and comparatively less wealthy 
households prefer to join microfinance system operating on the basis of joint liability 
loan contract (through forming Self-Help Group under SGSY scheme). But households 
with no asset or little valued asset are less possible to join in any microfinance system. 
The valued asset of the wealthier rural households can any time be considered as 
collateral at the time of drawing micro credit. Here, as their activities after taking credit is 
monitored by the microfinance institution itself with the help of its motivators, the 
disbursement of loan is not time taking and does not depend on the consent of other rural 
households which we observe in group-lending system. Besides that their demand of 
micro credit is comparatively more (on an average Rs.4000) than the new entrants in 
SGSY scheme whose demand for credit is not more than Rs.2000. We have already 
mentioned that one of the drawbacks of microfinance system under joint liability is size 
of credit offered to a self-help group member is relatively small because here total group 
is responsible for repayment of that loan with interest if that borrower defaults. So the 
group does not take any risk through granting larger size of loan to a borrower in fear of 
default. Hence, a household who has few assets and have the opportunity to expand his 
small business and want to do that taking larger size of credit prefers to join microfinance 
system operating on the basis of individual liability loan contract. The required size of 
compulsory savings here also plays the role of decision making factor because wealthier 
rural households have the capability to save regularly in VSSU where the minimum size 
of monthly micro-savings is Rs.300. But for new clients of SGSY scheme the size of 
compulsory savings is around Rs.40 which is easily affordable for the poorer rural 
households. As size of credit depends of accumulated savings of that household in any 
type of microfinance system and capacity of savings of a household depends on income 
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which itself is highly correlated with the value of asset of that household, we can claim 
that probability of wealthier among not so affluent rural households to join VSSU is 
much more than joining government supported SGSY scheme through forming SHG. It is 
also established that aged persons are less prone to join in any type of microfinance 
program and households with high dependency ratio and entrepreneurial activity and (or) 
any technical skill and with higher value of Woman’s Empowerment Index is slightly 
more prone to join microfinance system operating on the basis of joint liability loan 
contract.          
Appendix-1 
Calculation of Women’s Empowerment Index: (Asked either the member or wife 
(mother) of the member 
Name of the Variable Points 
1. Decision about utilization of Micro-
credit 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
2. Decision on purchase of daily food 
items 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
3. Decision on purchase of live stock Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
4. Decision on purchase of utensils 
and other household items 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
5. Decision on child education, child 
vaccination and other health related 
matters 
Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
6. Does she earn regularly and 
contribute in her family? 
Yes:- 2, No:-0 
7. Can she participate in different 
gram sabhas according to her will? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
8. Can she spend for consumable 
goods (cosmetics) according to her 
will? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
9. Can she go outside without taking 
permission from her husband or 
elder son? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
10. Can she caste her vote according to 
her will? 
Yes: -2, No:-0 
11. Can she protect herself against 
domestic violence? 
Yes: -1, No:-0 
12. Decision on Family Planning  Female:-2, Both:-1, Male:-0 
 
   Maximum point is 20 and more point indicates more Empowerment of Woman or more 
intra-household decision making power of the main woman of the sample household.     
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i The assumption is based from our experience collected from field survey. 
ii The survey was conducted between August to December in 2008. This time period was considered in 
order to minimize the recall period of each respondent. 
iii The market value of land in Mandir Bazar block was Rs.30,000 per bigha in August to October 2007 . 
Here 33 decimals = 1 bigha. 
iv Dependency ratio of a household is the ratio between total number of adult equivalent family members, 
and total adult equivalent earning member of that respondent household. Following Townsend (1994) we 
have considered 1 for any adult family member (both male and female), .25 for any member of that 
household up to six years of old and .50 for any member of the household between 6 to 14 years of old. 
 
